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The ‘Justice’ That Overrules the Rules
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Abstract:
Justice is intrinsically distributive; it distributes by its rules. ‘Distributive’ or ‘social’
justice redistributes by overruling them. It has theories that do not start ‘from here’.
It has no rules; it makes claims instead. Both its names are fraudulent aliases, ‘social’
perhaps less blatantly so. Satisfaction of a claim in ‘social’ justice depends on politics
and tends to favour the poorer half of society. This commands general sympathy, but
sympathy does not make it any less unjust.
It is a hackneyed story, but ﬁts the present context too well to resist re-telling it:
the traveller asks the passing Irishman the way to Enniskillen. The Irishman
replies that if he wanted to get to Enniskillen, he would not start from here.
Hartmut Kliemt (1998) rightly reproaches theories of justice that, much like
the Irishman in the story, would start from somewhere else, from a tabula rasa,
a hundred grains of manna to be divided among us all, a cake to be sliced, an
Original Position, or—a concession to reality?—from the purported genetic sur-
vival strategy of the pre-historic hunter-gatherer that is to be understood as
the precursor of the Original Position. Since he knows that we can only start
from where we are, Kliemt denies himself the pleasure of showing up the in-
consistencies and self-contradictions of the several theories of justice that have
been launched to occupy the terrain vacated by the retreat of utilitarian ethics.
He brushes them aside as irrelevant to reality, hence he treats it as irrelevant,
too, whether they are well-constructed or jerry-built. He makes an exception,
though, of contractarian theory, which he condemns explicitly for postulating a
hypothetical contract concluded in hypothetical circumstances by hypothetical
people. The condemnation seems to me richly deserved. However, his main in-
terest is not in asking what would be just. He wants to start from the status
quo shaped by what in Western democracies passes for the rule of law and its
confrontation (or accommodation) with the de facto claims of what he, true to his
magnanimously conciliatory nature, agrees to call “distributive justice”.
The present writer, who is much less good-natured, would line up the com-
batants differently and in particular would deny them the advantage of calling
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is itself a distribution of goods and bads, beneﬁts and burdens, rights and obli-
gations, acquittals and sentences (or a macro-distribution of these things made
up of micro-distributions of them), it must have reached this distribution by the
operation of the rules of property and contract and the exercise of liberties. If it
so happens that some part of the distribution has resulted from a breach of the
rules or the violation of liberties, redress is due according to the same rules. All
distribution is a self-contained and self-correcting result of fully enforced rules
that delineate just and unjust, optional and obligatory. Whether all parts and
aspects of a distribution are seamlessly encompassed by the rules is an open
question that arises in regard to discretionary rewards or charges, and is not
of paramount importance. The converse of the question, though, is not open.
All distributions may not be matters of justice, but all justice is distributive.
To speak of ‘distributive justice’ is a strict pleonasm like wet water or female
woman. To reserve the name to breaches of justice that replace a rule-based
distribution by something different, i.e. a redistribution, is fraudulent usurpa-
tion of the word ‘justice’. The fraudulent effect subsists even if the misuse of the
word was not due to deliberate deceit.
Trying to limit the damage, in the remainder of this paper I will avoid the
term ‘distributive justice’, for the adjective ‘distributive’, redundant as it may
be, designates any and all justice and does too much honour to what is, in my
view, a systematic breach of the rules of justice. Failing a cleverer and less
compromising alternative, I will henceforth call it ‘social justice’.
Damage is still liable to be done, for it is confusing to use the word ‘justice’
to denote a practice that, I shall argue, is in a strict sense unjust. At least,
however, the clumsy adjective ‘social’, though meaning precious little, is there to
warn us that ‘social’ justice is a different animal from the justice whose rules it
overrules.
Kliemt holds that different rules of justice govern distributions in the Aris-
totelian community and in the Hayekian “Great Society”. Perhaps one should
add to the community the Enterprise Association of Michael Oakeshott (1996),
an idea of society he abhors, that places distributive duties on people they would
not have if they were not engaged in a common enterprise. The idea is not im-
plausible, but looks difﬁcult to apply; for what I feel is a community strikes you
as an enterprise association, while he thinks that it is really a ‘great society’,
and I cannot imagine the sort of evidence that would reveal who of the three of
us is right about the type of society we all three inhabit.
James Buchanan once1 told a parable about a party of ﬁshermen going out
in a boat. Some ﬁshed from the starboard, the others from the port side. The
starboard crew made a rich haul, the port crew caught nothing. They went
share-and-share-alike as if each had contributed equally to the catch. Buchanan
felt that any other distribution would have been unjust.
But this conclusion does not come as a matter of course. There might have
been a local custom of equal shares (with something reserved for the boat), or
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perhaps an understanding that on this trip equal shares will be the rule. Failing
custom or understanding, however, there is nothing to establish a presumption
for equal sharing. If any rule of justice can be applied, it is ‘ﬁnders keepers’ with
a share set aside for the use of the boat. Whether we are in the community or
the ‘great society’ depends on the rule of justice, if any, that governs the case
in hand, rather than vice versa. The rules of justice rooted in basic conventions
seem to change but little cross-culturally, even if their elaboration in common or
statute law differs as between states.
What is, to use fashionable language, ‘hard-wired’ in civilised man in any
type of reasonably civilised society, great or small, is two sets of rules with a
small and uncertain overlapping segment between them. One we might call the
justice of property. It takes care of the integrity of persons and their property,
the keeping of reciprocal promises, the protection from nuisances and incivili-
ties. It answers most questions of right or wrong, free or unfree. The other set
could be called the justice of equality. It settles questions of distribution not
automatically determined or deliberately decided by the justice of property. In
fact, it would have little relevance, and might not even be recognised as a dis-
tinct set of rules, if the justice of property were elaborate enough to settle all
questions of distribution. Requiring equality in distributions not otherwise de-
termined springs from acceptance of the axiom that like cases must be treated
alike. Since all cases are both like and unlike each other, likeness reduces to
cases being ‘relevantly’ functions of the same variable, other variables being ig-
nored as irrelevant. For example, if the relevant variable for the distributions
due to two workmen is the number of hours each has worked, equality demands
that the one who worked twice as long as the other should get twice the wages.
This is the familiar Aristotelian equality in its simple form. However, a distribu-
tion may be composed of many different simple equalities. Take, for example, a
micro-distribution such as a ﬁrm’s payroll. Some employees may be paid accord-
ing to hours worked, others according to skill, yet others by seniority, while the
managers’ pay may be governed by responsibility. The payroll displays much
inequality, but it is in fact a compound of a number of simple equalities, each
the function of its relevant variable. In this micro-distribution, the justice of
contract and the justice of equality may overlap: the wage scales may be settled
by contract, but if they diverge widely from the justice of equality, they will be a
source of disapproval.
Radical egalitarians will disregard compound equalities and condemn a dis-
tribution that is in effect a compound equality for failing to be a simple equality.
They will attack it like bulls in the china shop, ironing out the apparent in-
equalities and thus devastating the underlying compound equality which was in
perfect compliance with the justice of equality.
Some distributions are entirely discretionary, independent of consent by the
recipient. The marking of examination papers, the award of prizes and honours,
the sentencing of criminals (within broad limits) or the furloughs of frontline
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awarding of such discretionary goods or bads, it is the justice of equality that
can be of albeit limited help. The justice of property is, of course, not concerned.
One of the many things that discussions with Hartmut Kliemt have made
clear to the present author is that there is no injustice stricto sensu unless there
was an unjust act to bring it about. Unjust states of affairs are not born by
immaculate conception, nor are they auto-generated. Moreover, the unjust act
that serves as their necessary condition must not simply be one that most of
us would disapprove of. It must be an actual, ascertainable breach of a rule of
justice. Obedience to the rules and redress of disobedience make a just state of
affairs at least logically possible.
Reﬂection on the nature of ‘social’ justice and more particularly on what may
distinguish it from justice tout court and earn it the adjective ‘social’, leads to
the conclusion that seems merely formal but, if right, sheds light on political
practice of the day. Social justice has no rules. None can be discovered by logical
or factual inquiry. Instead of rules, it operates by staking claims to speciﬁc
changes in any existing distribution. However, as it has no rules, it recognises
no state of affairs as socially just. All its claims can never be fully satisﬁed
and a socially just state of affairs created, because there are inﬁnitely many
redistributive claims capable of serving someone/s interests and the satisfaction
of any number of such claims must still leave any number unsatisﬁed.
Any person whose claim was satisﬁed in a redistribution may have further
claims under the new distribution.
It is widely believed, I think on no solid ground, that social justice does have
a rule, namely the reduction and ultimate abolition of inequalities, and that the
social justice and the egalitarian agenda are synonymous. Dealing for the mo-
ment only with money incomes this would mean that once all incomes above the
mean were cut off at the mean level and redistributed to those having below-
mean incomes, equality having been reached, a socially just state of affairs will
have been reached. But this is only too obviously not the case. Equal money
will leave many inequalities and, worst of all, create new non-monetary ones.
Moreover, monetary equality will generate claims of social justice on grounds of
unequal desert unequal need, merit goods, or some less plausible pretext. Since
there is no rule in social justice for ruling out claims on certain grounds, and
since substitute grounds could always be found by claimants, any given distri-
bution resulting from redistribution would bear in itself reasons for renewed re-
distribution. This mechanism is not the same as the ‘cycling’ that characterises,
for instance, a three-person distribution game, though it resembles it to some
degree.
In justice, redress can only follow a breach of a rule. In social justice, a
claim for a redistribution is not grounded on any rule. It is simply a good try.
Whether it is satisﬁed depends on the politics of the time and place. Where
political decisions ultimately depend on majority vote, claims in social justice
that ostensibly or really favour the poor have a better chance of being satisﬁed
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case. Measure favouring the poor at the expense of every body else will usu-
ally command sympathy, but sympathy does not make them less unjust.
Kliemt is persuaded,—as are most social scientists and most intelligent lay-
men, though the present author is trying to make the contrary case—that en-
forcement of the rules of justice can only be assured by a central authority
with coercive power to raise the wherewithal by taxation. Taxation is almost
inevitably redistributive. Hence the legal order presupposes coercive redistri-
bution. The argument can be extended to all public goods if they, too, cannot
be provided by some mechanism of voluntary cooperation. Willy-nilly facing the
danger of slippery-slope arguments, Kliemt regards a “minimal welfare state”
as the provider of the legal order as a necessary condition of social coexistence.
He is, however, also persuaded that there are good reasons for calling a spade a
spade. Instrumental redistribution should not be dressed up as distributive or
social justice (Kliemt 1998, 635).
The logical and semantic muddle of assimilating redistribution to justice is
indeed hard to pardon and there is not the slightest reason why one should
pardon it. But it is even more unforgivable that the sloppy language of ‘social’
justice has by and by become, by force of relentless repetition, a bearer of moral
truth. Mild-mannered, courteous and indulgent as always, Kliemt regards the
deceitful exploitation of the persuasive terms ‘distributive’ and ‘social’ justice
more in sorrow than in anger. More anger, more contempt or more of both might
have been unseemly, but not undeserved.
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